YOU’VE BEEN HACKED: HOW TO BETTER
INCENTIVIZE CORPORATIONS TO PROTECT
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The number of data breaches in the U.S. has hit record highs in each of the past
two years. These breaches overwhelmingly affect consumers, who have lost Social Security
numbers, debit and credit card information, and birthdates. However, hackers are not
targeting individual consumers; rather, they are hacking big corporations that have lax
and out-of-date data security measures in place. After a data breach occurs, lawmakers
and consumers alike are left wondering how and why so many preventable data breaches
occur. This Article suggests that the current laws regulating data breaches are inadequate
to incentivize big corporations to invest in reasonable data security practices. To remedy
these shortcomings, this Article proposes that Congress adopt a uniform law regulating
data security practices that holds officers and directors accountable for implementing
various data protection measures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the world has seen a sharp increase in the
number of data breaches involving businesses, with a record–breaking
number of breaches in 2017.1 The average cost in 2017 for a company
that suffered a data breach was approximately $7.35 million.2 Most
recently, the U.S. company Equifax suffered a data breach in which
hackers stole more than 143 million customers’ private data.3 Before
Equifax, it was Sony that dealt with the fallout from an embarrassing data
2017: The Year of the Data Breach, BLOOMBERG: PRIV. AND SEC. BLOG (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/2017-year-data-b73014473359; see also Jimmy H. Koo, Data
Breaches in U.S. Allegedly Increasing at Record Pace, BLOOMBERG: PRIV. AND SEC. BLOG (July
24, 2017), https://www.bna.com/data-breaches-us-b73014462190 (citing At Mid-Year,
U.S. Data Breaches Increase at Record Pace, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR. BLOG (July 18, 2017),
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/at-mid-year-u-s-data-breaches-increase-at-record-pace).
Through mid-December of 2017, the number of data breaches in the U.S. has reached a
record high—1,253 publicly reported breaches. In comparison, in 2016—the previous
record holder for the most data breaches—there were 1,093 breaches. 2017: The Year of
the Data Breach, supra.
1

PONEMON INST., 2017 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY: UNITED STATES 1 (2017),
https://hosteddocs.ittoolbox.com/ponemon_databreach-20170825.pdf.
2

Karen Turner, The Equifax Hacks are a Case Study in Why We Need Better Data Breach Laws,
VOX (Sept. 14, 2017, 10:17 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2017/9/13/16292014/equifax-credit-breach-hack-report-security.
3
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breach that exposed confidential employee data, as well as leaked a couple
of soon-to-be released films onto the internet.4 To add icing on the cake,
the hackers released a number of emails among the executives at Sony
discussing their opinions of various actors and actresses that previously
worked with the studio.5
Although the number of data breaches is on track to reach record
numbers this year,6 consumers will likely not receive much compensation
from these businesses for exposing their data. The difficulty for a
consumer is proving the actual injury or damage suffered as a result of the
breach.7 In a 2014 study, 81% of consumers that were victims of a data
breach did not experience any monetary harm and, when a consumer did
suffer monetary harm, the average cost to the consumer was about $38.8
However, this does not take into account the stress and time spent on the
consumer’s behalf,9 which is difficult to prove in terms of monetary harm.
Typically, this monetary harm does not include the long-term fallout for
consumers having their private information publicly available, such as the

Katelyn A. Marshall, Note, Cyber-Security Issue: Protecting Consumers in a Cyber World—Why
the Federal Trade Commission Has the Advantage, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 105, 105–06 (2016). The
hacked Sony employees’ data included Social Security numbers, email addresses, and
salaries. Id. at 105. What was likely more damaging to the company itself was the leak
of two films, The Interview and Annie, available online prior to their release date. Id. at 105.
4

Id. at 105–06. The emails also brought to light the insensitivity of the executives. Amy
Kaufman, The Embarrassing Emails that Preceded Amy Pascal’s Resignation, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
5, 2015, 1:08 PM), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ctamy-pascal-email-rogen-hirai-20150205-story.html.
For example, Sony’s Cochairwoman at the time of the hack, Amy Pascal, had a disturbing email exchange with a
big-name producer, in which the two discussed an upcoming fundraising event for
President Obama. Id. Pascal, in discussing what she would ask President Obama, joked
with the producer that she would ask the President whether he liked a number of recent
movies, including Django Unchained and 12 Years a Slave, starring mostly African
Americans. Id. This email correspondence, among others, led Pascal to resign. Id.
5

6

Koo, supra note 1.

See Nicole Hong, For Consumers, Injury is Hard to Prove in Data-Breach Cases: Judges Wrestle
with Whether Hacked Firms Should Have to Compensate Exposed Customers, WALL ST. J. (June
26, 2016, 8:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-consumers-injury-is-hard-toprove-in-data-breach-cases-1466985988.
7

PONEMON INST., THE AFTERMATH OF A DATA BREACH: CONSUMER SENTIMENT 7
(April 2014).
8

9

Id. at 6.
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eventual opening of fraudulent accounts in their name or some other form
of identity theft.10
Another significant issue that consumers face when they bring an
action against a company that suffers a data breach is the constitutional
standing requirement under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.11 In many
cases, the personal information that is leaked via a data breach may not
have been used in a fraudulent way at the time of the lawsuit.12 This
generally is the case because hackers typically hold on to the stolen data
(particularly Social Security numbers, birthdates, and names) before selling
it on the black market.13 Ultimately, the difficulty for consumers in
showing the monetary harm caused by a data breach undermines their
status as an injured party.14 However, this should not relieve companies
from taking reasonable measures to protect the data they obtain from
consumers. After all, these companies do profit from this data.15
Regardless of the severity of the harm that consumers suffer from
these data breaches, companies in many of these situations fail to take
reasonable precautions to protect sensitive data. A 2016 report found that
63% of data breaches involve hackers exploiting weak, preset, or stolen
passwords.16 The circumstances surrounding the Equifax data breach
serve as an example of a company failing to take simple steps to prevent

See Andrea Peterson, Data Exposed in Breaches Can Follow People Forever. The Protections
Offered
in
Their
Wake
Don’t.,
WASH.
POST
(June
15,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/06/15/data-exposedin-breaches-can-follow-people-forever-the-protections-offered-in-their-wakedont/?utm_term=.5f4c356fbee8.
10

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Patricia Cave, Comment, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand
On: Finding Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Court in Data Security Breach
Suits, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 765, 768–69 (2013).
11

12

Cave, supra note 11, at 774.

Peterson, supra note 10 (discussing how credit and debit card numbers have a short
shelf life compared to that of Social Security numbers, names, and birthdates).
13

14

Cave, supra note 11, at 774.

THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE BUSINESS OF DATA 7 (2016),
https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/images/Business%20of%20
Data%20briefing%20paper%20WEB.pdf.
15

2016 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS 21 (2016),
www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2016_Report_en_xg.pdf.
16
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the sensitive data of over a hundred million people from being disclosed.17
A vulnerability in a web-application that Equifax utilized was brought to
the company’s attention in March of 2017.18 Equifax failed to install the
necessary updates to fix the vulnerability.19 As a result, in May of 2017,
hackers breached the web-application, stealing 143 million peoples’
sensitive data.20 Thus, Equifax had over two months to install an update
that would have prevented the data breach from occurring.21
This Article argues that the current legal framework for data
security suffers numerous problems that undermine its effectiveness at
ensuring that companies protect sensitive consumer data. Those
problems include gaps in the law due to industry specific federal statutes,
a compliance nightmare for large corporations having to comply with
multiple states’ potentially different laws, and a reactive rather than
proactive approach to improving data security practices. Part II discusses
the current legal framework for data privacy in the U.S. Part III then
reviews a number of the high-profile data breaches over the past five years
as proof that the current legal framework is ineffective at incentivizing
companies to implement reasonable data security measures. Finally, Part
IV proposes that Congress create a uniform federal data privacy statute
that creates a two-tracked approach to regulating data security.
II. THE CURRENT DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LEGAL
LANDSCAPE
This section will separate the current laws and rules governing data
privacy into three categories, analyzing the categories from most to least
impactful in terms of regulating data security. The first category, discussed
in Section A, focuses on the rules created by federal regulatory agencies to
monitor data security practices. The second category, discussed in Section
B, views the federal laws that regulate data security. The final category,
discussed in Section C, notes the protections afforded by state law.
See Lely Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:27
PM), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-no-excuse/.
17

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id.
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Ultimately, these three categories show that the current legal landscape in
the area of data security fails to motivate companies to adopt reasonable
data security practices.
A. The Most Significant Source of Data Security Regulation: Federal
Regulatory Agencies
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is perhaps the most
established regulatory agency monitoring data security at this time. The
FTC derives its authority for governing data security from Section 5(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).22 Generally, Section
5(a)(2) of the FTC Act states, “The [FTC] is hereby empowered and
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”23 The statute
defines unfair and deceptive practices as those acts that “cause or are likely
to cause reasonably foreseeable injury within the United States. . . .”24
Since 2002, the FTC has brought more than 60 cases against companies
for unfair or deceptive practices that unreasonably risked exposing
consumers’ data.25 However, recently some of these companies have
challenged the FTC’s authority to regulate data security practices under
Section 5.26
In FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,27 Wyndham Worldwide
Corporation (Wyndham) suffered three data breaches over a two-year
Crystal N. Skelton, FTC Data Security Enforcement: Analyzing the Past, Present, and Future,
25 No. 1 Competition: J. ANTI., UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. B. CAL. 302, 303 (2016).
22

23

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2016).

See Id. § 45(a)(4)(A). Notably, the statute does not enumerate specific kinds of business
practices that constitute unfair and deceptive acts. See generally id. Marshall, supra note 4,
at 112 n.58.
24

FTC, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY: UPDATE: 2016,
https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016.
25

at

4

(2016),

Skelton, supra note 22, at 306. This Article will focus solely on the Wyndham case,
although another company, LabMD, challenged the FTC’s authority as well to regulate
data security. In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 1, 5 (F.T.C. July 29, 2016). In this case, the
Commission reversed the administrative law judge (ALJ), holding that the ALJ applied
the wrong legal standard for unfairness. Id. The Commission concluded that LabMD’s
cybersecurity practices constituted an unfair practice within the meaning of Section 5(a)
of the FTC Act. Id.
26

27

799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
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period.28 The hackers stole hundreds of thousands of customers’ personal
and financial data, resulting in over $10.6 million dollars in fraudulent
charges.29 The FTC filed a lawsuit against Wyndham in federal district
court alleging that Wyndham engaged in unfair and deceptive data security
practices leading to the data breach.30 Wyndham filed a motion to dismiss
the FTC’s suit, which was denied by the district court.31 However, the
district court certified its ruling for interlocutory appeal on two issues.32
The first issue was whether the FTC had the authority to regulate
cybersecurity under the unfairness prong of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.33
The second issue was whether Wyndham received fair notice that its data
protection practices could violate the unfairness prong.34 On the first
issue, the Third Circuit held that the FTC has authority under the
unfairness prong to regulate cybersecurity.35 The Court on the second
issue held that “Wyndham was not entitled to know with ascertainable
certainty the FTC’s interpretation of what cybersecurity practices were
required” under Section 5(a).36 Rather, Wyndham simply had to know that
its data security practices could be governed by the statute.37 Ultimately,
28

Id.

29

Id.

Id. Specifically, the FTC listed seven practices that Wyndham engaged in that were the
basis for the unfair and deceptive practices action: (1) the company allowed its hotels to
store consumer payment data in an unencrypted format, making the data clearly readable;
(2) Wyndham permitted the use of weak passwords for accessing the company’s property
management system; (3) there was a failure to use commonplace data security measures
like firewalls; (4) the company failed to implement adequate data security policies and
procedures leading to out-of-date software; (5) Wyndham did not limit the access of its
third-party vendors so as to prevent them from accessing the company’s network and
servers; (6) there was not an appropriate system in place for detecting and preventing
unauthorized access to the company’s networks and servers; and (7) Wyndham did not
follow any sort of procedures for responding to the first hack, allowing the hackers to
use a similar exploitation for the second and third hacks. Id. at 240–41; Skelton, supra
note 22, at 307 (referencing the outcome of this lawsuit).
30

31

Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 242; Skelton, supra note 22, at 307.

32

Skelton, supra note 22, at 307.

33

Id; Wyndham, 799 F. 3d at 242.

34

Skelton, supra note 22, at 307; Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 249.

35

Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 247–49.

36

Id. at 255–58.

37

Id.
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this case clarifies the authority the FTC has to regulate unfair and
deceptive data security practices under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.38
Since the FTC has the power to regulate unfair and deceptive data
security practices, the focus now shifts to its methodology for curbing
such practices. Broadly speaking, the FTC divides its focus into deception
claims and unfairness claims when regulating data security practices.39 For
deception claims, the FTC is focused on whether a business
misrepresented its privacy and security practices, or its controls for
protecting consumer data related to one of its products.40 Alternatively,
for an unfairness claim, the FTC is focused on businesses that fail to
implement or maintain reasonably adequate data protection mechanisms
for protecting consumers’ personal information in a way that causes or is
likely to cause significant injury to the consumer.41 The FTC adds a
qualifier by stating that the injury to the consumer cannot be outweighed
by the benefits to the consumer, nor can the injury be reasonably avoidable
by the consumer.42
On the day that the FTC reached its 50th data security settlement,
it commented on its overall method for regulating unfair and deceptive
data security practices, stating:
The touchstone of the Commission’s approach to data
security is reasonableness: a company’s data security
measures must be reasonable and appropriate in light of
the sensitivity and volume of consumer information it
holds, the size and complexity of its business, and the cost
of available tools to improve security and reduce
vulnerabilities.43
38

Marshall, supra note 4, at 120.

39

Skelton, supra note 22, at 304.

Id; see FTC POLICY STATEMENT
standards of misrepresentation).
40

ON

DECEPTION 2 (October 14, 1983) (discussing

Skelton, supra note 22, at 304; see FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS
(December 17, 1980) (discussing standards of consumer injury, violations of public
policy, and unethical or unscrupulous conduct).
41

Skelton, supra note 22, at 304; see FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note
41.
42

FTC, COMMISSION STATEMENT MARKING
SETTLEMENT 1 (2014).
43

THE

FTC’S 50TH DATA SECURITY
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The FTC’s methodology in regulating data security practices appears to be
a sliding-scale approach. Besides these insights, the FTC published a guide
providing businesses with five key principles to data protection.44 Those
five key principles are: (1) “[k]now what personal information you have in
your files on your computers,” (2) “[k]eep only what you need for your
business,” (3) “[p]rotect the information that you keep,” (4) “[p]roperly
dispose of what you no longer need,” and (5) “[c]reate a plan for
responding to security incidents.”45 These factors, and the FTC’s
approach more broadly, all focus on companies implementing reasonable
data security practices.
As discussed in Part III, a number of large companies have failed
to follow these principles, which ultimately has led to massive data
breaches.46 This calls the effectiveness of the FTC’s current approach into
question. Since the FTC brought its first action in 2002, the FTC has
brought over 60 actions against businesses for unfair and deceptive data
security practices.47 Nevertheless, the overall number of data breaches has
increased over this period of time.48 One could argue that the increase in
data breaches is a natural result of the increased amount of data that
today’s current society creates and stores electronically on servers.49
However, such an argument fails to focus on the unreasonable data
security practices of many companies that lead to these breaches. If the
amount of electronic data continues to increase in our society,50 then we
need to incentivize companies to do a better job at protecting that data.
Thus, this shows that the FTC’s reasonableness approach, currently and
in the future, will fail to adequately incentivize companies to take
reasonable data security measures that will reduce the number of breaches
disclosing consumers’ personal data.
FTC, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A GUIDE
[hereinafter PPI: A Guide for Business].
44

FOR

45

Id. at 2–30.

46

See infra Part III.

47

FTC, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY: UPDATE: 2016, at 4 (2016).

BUSINESS 1 (2016)

Nate Lord, The History of Data Breaches, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (July 27, 2017),
https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches (noting that the number of data
breaches in 2005 was 157 compared to 783 in 2014).
48

49

Id.

50

Id.
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The other regulatory agency that has recently started regulating
data security is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
Specifically, the CFPB recently began regulating financial institutions that
engage in unfair and deceptive cybersecurity practices, bringing its first
ever enforcement action in March of 2016.51 Congress gave the CFPB the
power to regulate unfair and deceptive practices in 2010 with the passage
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.52
The grant of authority given to the CFPB mirrors much of the same
language that serves as the basis for the FTC’s authority under Section 5(a)
of the FTC Act.53 The main difference between the authority granted to
the FTC and the CFPB is that the CFPB is limited to bringing actions
against financial institutions or businesses that are involved in the financial
industry.54 Because the CFPB’s first and only enforcement action related
to cybersecurity occurred in March of 2016,55 it is still too early to
determine the regulatory impact the CFPB may potentially have in
bringing enforcement actions against financial companies that have unfair
and deceptive data security practices. If the FTC’s approach is effective
in combating data breaches, then one would think that the CFPB would
have similar success in regulating the financial industry.
However, the CFPB’s authority to regulate data security practices
is limited to the financial industry,56 which limits its overall effectiveness.
In 2016, only 9% of the data breaches involving the financial industry
disclosed personal information, compared to 27% in the retail industry
and 45% in the information industry (which includes social media sites
and cloud storage servers).57 This exemplifies why the CFPB’s regulation
CFPB Takes Action Against Dwolla for Misrepresenting Data Security Practices, CFPB (Mar. 2,
2016),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-actionagainst-dwolla-for-misrepresenting-data-security-practices/.
51

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 2005 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2010)).
52

53

Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2016) with 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a).

54

12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2010).

See Evan Weinberger, Equifax Data Breach Highlights Regulatory Shortfall, LAW 360 (Sept.
8, 2017, 8:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/962025/equifax-data-breachhighlights-regulatory-shortfall.
55

56

Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) with 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a).

2017 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS 19, 24, 30
(2017),
57
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of data security practices in the financial industry would have a limited
impact in protecting consumers more generally. Finally, there is currently
uncertainty surrounding the fate of the agency, as its constitutionality has
recently been called into question.58
B. A Potpourri of Federal Law
The current federal legislation directly governing data security in
the United States is a hodgepodge of industry-specific statutes.59
Currently, there is no uniform federal statute governing data security and
privacy.60 The lack of a uniform federal data security law creates a number
of gaps in which various industries, outside of the financial and healthcare
sectors, face little to no data security regulation outside of breach
notification laws.61 In addition, most of the industry-specific laws center
around businesses in those industries disclosing their data protection
practices and using care when handling sensitive consumer data.62 As
discussed previously, the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to regulate unfair
and deceptive trade practices.63 The remainder of this section will examine
some of the other well-known federal statutes providing data protection.
The Financial Services Modernization Act (also known as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) requires the FTC, among other regulatory
agencies that monitor financial institutions, to enforce its privacy
provisions.64 To fulfill its requirements, the FTC created the Privacy of
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2017_Report_en_xg.
pdf.
Renae Merle, Federal Judge Rules that Consumer Protection Bureau is Unconstitutional,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (June 21, 2018, 5:05 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-biz-judge-rules-cfpb-unconstitutional-20180621-story.html.
58

See, e.g. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012); Financial Services
Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–27 (2012); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1301 (2012); Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
59

60

Skelton, supra note 22, at 305.

Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency Through a State-Informed
Federal Data Breach Notification and Data Protection Law, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
45, 52–54 (2015).
61

62

Marshall, supra note 4, at 108.

63

See supra text accompanying notes 22–24.

64

15 U.S.C. § 6822 (2012).
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Consumer Financial Information Rule (Privacy Rule).65 This Rule covers
two categories of businesses: (1) financial institutions and (2) businesses
that receive “nonpublic personal information” from financial institutions
of which they are not affiliated.66 “Nonpublic personal information”
(NPI) is defined as any personally identifiable financial information that a
financial institution obtains about an individual in the course of providing
a financial product or service, except if the information is generally
publicly available.67 Information that is publicly available is described as
information that is lawfully available to the public, and the individual can
direct that the information not be made public but has not done so.68
Ultimately, the Privacy Rule only provides requirements and guidance for
what is required of businesses in terms of disclosing to consumers their
company’s privacy policies and practices.69
However, the FTC created a Safeguards Rule to regulate business’s
protection of NPI.70 The Safeguards Rule requires, among other things,
that businesses adopt a written security plan that includes: (1) designating
one or more employees to manage the security program,71 (2) methods for
identifying and assessing the risks to customer information in each facet
of the company’s business, as well as analyzing the effectiveness of the
current safeguards in place,72 (3) policies for designing, implementing, and
65

See 16 C.F.R. § 313.1 (2012).

FTC, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE PRIVACY OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL INFORMATION
RULE OF THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT 2 (2002).
66

Id. at 4. The FTC elaborates on types of information that are considered NPI by
providing three areas in which information obtained by a business will constitute NPI:
(1) any information that a person provides a business for the purpose of receiving a
financial service or product, including name, address, income, Social Security number,
etc.; (2) any information that an individual provides a business in the course of a
transaction involving the business’s financial product or service, including credit or debit
card information, payment history, the fact that the individual is a consumer, etc.; and (3)
any information that a business obtains about an individual in connection with providing
a financial service or product, including court records or consumer reports. Id.
67

68

Id. at 5.

69

Id. at 6–13.

FTC Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 314.1(a)
(2012).
70

71

Id. § 314.4(a).

72

Id. § 314.4(b)(1)–(3).
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regularly testing the security program,73 (4) standards for partnering with
service providers that are capable of maintaining appropriate safeguards,74
and (5) internal requirements for evaluating and revising the company’s
security program based on the testing and monitoring requirement in (3).75
Overall, the Safeguards Rule appears comprehensive in its requirements.
But, as a practical matter, in many cases the FTC will only learn of
violations of the Safeguards Rule once a data breach has already occurred.
Since 2010, the FTC has brought six actions against businesses for
violating the Safeguards Rule under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.76 Four
out of the five actions were in response to a business that already suffered
a data breach.77 Therefore, the enforcement of the Safeguards Rule is
reactive rather than proactive, meaning a hacker has already obtained a
consumer’s NPI by the time the FTC brings an enforcement action. In
addition, the Safeguards Rule only applies to financial institutions or
businesses involved in the financial industry, which limits its applicability
to a small subset of businesses.
The other well-known federal statute governing data security is the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (also referred
to as HIPAA).78 Congress tasked the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) with developing and regulating privacy and
security of health information.79 To meet these statutory obligations, the
73

Id. § 314.4(c).

74

Id. § 314.4(d)(1)–(2).

75

Id. § 314.4(e).

See Cases and Proceedings: Advanced Search: Consumer Protection Topics: Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, FTC: ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
advanced-search (select “Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act” from the “Consumer Protection
Topics” dropdown menu) (last visited Mar. 22nd, 2018).
76

See Complaint at 4–5, para. 15–18, In re Taxslayer, LLC, (No. C-4626) (F.T.C. Oct. 20,
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the defendants misrepresented data security policies to consumers).
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HHS developed two rules: (1) the “Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information” and (2) the “Security Standards for the
Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information.”80
The
distinction between these two rules is that the first rule is geared towards
regulating which covered entities may have access to protected health
information (PHI), while the second rule establishes standards for
protecting electronic PHI (EPHI) from unauthorized access.81 Thus, the
focus here will be on the Security Standards for the Protection of EPHI
as it is more pertinent to the topic of data breaches.
In general, the security standards are divided into three
categories.82 First, there are administrative safeguards, which establish
eight standards for companies to follow in relation to managing and
training requirements for EPHI protection.83 Second, there are physical
safeguards that create four standards that mostly relate to actual access and
protection of the electronic systems and equipment that store EPHI.84
Finally, there are technical safeguards that generally institute five standards
dealing with authentication controls and minimum hardware and software
requirements for protecting EPHI.85 However, these standards only apply
to “covered entities,” which are generally health care providers, health
plans, and health care clearing houses.86 This makes the scope of these
data security protections rather narrow.
Outside the financial and health sectors, there is little to no federal
law protecting consumers’ sensitive data.87 In addition, most of the federal
laws governing data breaches involve the kinds of disclosures and notices

Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html
(last visited Nov. 16th, 2017).
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a business must make to a consumer once a breach has already occurred.88
Some have suggested that this lack of a uniform federal data security law
has fostered an environment where businesses have no incentive to
maintain high levels of security and protection for their data.89 However,
as the number of data breaches continue to rise, experts have begun to call
on Congress to adopt a uniform federal statute governing data privacy and
security.90 A potential framework for data protection and security is
discussed Part IV.
C. The Scope of State Laws
Due to the gaps that the industry-specific federal laws have
created, state laws have been left to fill in the holes.91 Most of the state
legislation pertaining to data breaches surrounds the notification
requirements for businesses that have already suffered a breach.92 As of
March 2018, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted
some form of legislation requiring businesses to notify individuals of
security breaches where personally identifiable information is exposed.93
However, the immense number of state statutes creates a compliance
headache for many large businesses, as those businesses could potentially
have to comply with fifty states’ differing data breach notification laws.94
Moreover, some of these data breach laws may conflict in terms of what
triggers the duty to notify a consumer.95 For example, Connecticut
requires a company to notify a consumer if there has been unauthorized
access to electronic files containing personal data.96 Alternatively,
Laura Hautala, Equifax Hack May Shake Up US Consumer Data Laws: Federal Lawmakers
are Pushing to Give You More Control Over Your Data, After Hackers Stole Information from 145
million Americans, CNET (Oct. 20, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news
/equifax-hack-may-shake-up-consumer-data-laws/.
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Wisconsin only requires a business to notify a consumer if the
unauthorized acquisition of the personal information creates a material
risk of identity theft or fraud for the affected consumer.97 Although
businesses could try to comply with the most restrictive state’s data breach
notification laws, conflicting state laws still create a compliance headache
for large businesses because they would constantly have to monitor fifty
different states’ laws to ensure it stays abreast of any changes.
Additionally, fifteen states have adopted some form of law
requiring businesses to maintain reasonable data security practices.98
Thus, although some states have enacted data security requirements that
97

WIS. STAT. § 134.98(2)(cm)(1) (2015–2016).

Data Security Laws—Private Sector, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/datasecurity-laws.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2018). The states that do require some sort of
reasonable data security practice include: (1) ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104(b) (2017)
(requiring businesses to “implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and
practices”); (2) CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (2016) (requiring businesses to
“implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
nature of the information”); (3) CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-471(a) (2017) (requiring business
to “safeguard the data, computer files and documents” containing personal information);
(4) FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2) (2014) (requiring businesses to “take reasonable measures to
protect and secure data in electronic form containing personal information”); (5) IND.
CODE § 24-4.9-3-3.5(a) (2017) (requiring businesses to “maintain reasonable procedures
to protect and safeguard from unlawful use or disclosure personal information”); (6)
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6, 139(b)(1) (2017) (requiring businesses to “[i]mplement and
maintain reasonable procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of the
information”); (7) MD. CODE ANN. § 14-3503 (West 2017) (requiring businesses to
“implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”); (8) MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 93H, § 2 (2017) (authorizing its department of consumer affairs and business
regulation to adopt regulations that “safeguard the personal information of residents”);
(9) MINN. STAT. § 325M.05 (2017) (governing the conduct of internet service providers
stating that they “shall take reasonable steps to maintain the security and privacy of a
consumer’s” sensitive data); (10) NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A.210 (2017) (requiring
businesses to “implement and maintain reasonable security measures to protect those
records from unauthorized access”); (11) N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C-4 (2017) (requiring
businesses to “implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”);
(12) OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.622 (2017) (adopting a framework similar to HIPAA
requiring businesses to implement a security program that includes three categories of
safeguards: administrative safeguards, technical safeguards, and physical safeguards); (13)
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-49.3-2 (West 2017) (requiring businesses to “implement
and maintain a risk-based information security program that contains reasonable security
procedures and practices”); (14) TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.052 (West 2017)
(requiring businesses to “implement and maintain reasonable procedures . . . to protect
from unlawful use or disclosure” of sensitive data); and (15) UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44201 (West 2017) (requiring businesses to “implement and maintain reasonable
procedures to prevent unlawful use or disclosure of personal information”).
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demand more from businesses than notifying consumers of a breach,
more than half of states only have data breach notification statutes.99 Data
breach notification laws are inadequate as they are reactive in nature: a data
breach has already occurred by the time that a data breach notification law
comes into play. Once a data breach occurs, hackers could have already
stolen a consumer’s personal information. Therefore, data breach laws
need to require companies to protect the sensitive data up front so as to
prevent a breach from happening in the first place. As alluded to above,
the difficulty with a large number of states adopting more stringent data
security laws is the compliance difficulties that arise from a lack of a
uniform standard. This suggests that a uniform law is needed to help
mitigate the compliance difficulties that would arise from forty-eight states
each having their own data security protection laws.
Another area of state law that has largely been ineffective in
curbing the amount of data breaches is the fiduciary duty requirements for
boards of directors and corporate officers.100 To start, the board of
directors and officers only owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
shareholders, not to the consumers that are harmed by the data
breaches.101 Further, two high-profile derivative suits stemming from data
breaches over the past five years have failed.102
In the first of the lawsuits, a stockholder of Wyndham Worldwide
Corporation sent a letter to the board of directors demanding the board
investigate and remedy the harm caused by the data breaches.103 After the
board decided not to file a lawsuit based on the breaches, the plaintiff
stockholder filed a derivative suit against Wyndham and a number of its
corporate officers, alleging that the company failed to implement and

99
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maintain proper data security practices.104 The court dismissed the suit
holding that the plaintiff failed to plead facts, with particularity, that
establish that the board acted either in bad faith or based on an
unreasonable investigation.105 Therefore, the board’s decision not to file
a lawsuit based on the breaches received the protection of the “business
judgment rule.”106
The second lawsuit involved a shareholder of The Home Depot
suing twelve current and former corporate officers and directors of the
company.107 The shareholders alleged that the officers and directors
breached their duty of loyalty by not implementing proper internal
controls to oversee the risks that the company faced due to a potential
data breach.108 Moreover, the shareholders supported this allegation of a
breach of loyalty based on the fact that the board of directors disbanded
the committee that was tasked with overseeing the risks that could stem
from a data breach.109 Ultimately, the court granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss, holding that the shareholders failed to plead facts, with
particularity, that the board consciously failed to act in the face of a known
duty to act.110 The court found that the shareholders admitted that the
board acted before the breach occurred by approving a new data security
plan that would have remedied many of the vulnerabilities Home Depot
currently faced.111 The plan was simply not fully implemented at the time
the breach occurred.112
Despite these two recent examples of derivative suits arising from
data breaches failing, there are currently a number of other derivative suits
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still unresolved, including lawsuits involving Yahoo! and Wendy’s.113
Thus, there is a possibility that such lawsuits could start succeeding if
plaintiffs begin including more facts in the pleading stage.114 Nevertheless,
derivative suits do not provide a remedy for the consumers whose
sensitive data was obtained during these data breaches. Rather, these
derivative suits are used by shareholders in an attempt to recover the
amounts these companies paid out to consumers and others as a result of
the data breach.115 This, along with the many different state laws
governing data breach notification, shows that state law is inadequate for
forcing businesses to adopt better data security practices.
III. RECENT HIGH-PROFILE DATA BREACHES
As discussed previously, the FTC is arguably in the best position
to regulate and enforce data security laws.116 The FTC’s approach to
regulating data privacy and security is one of reasonableness.117 After the
FTC’s 50th data security settlement, the FTC stated:
The Commission will continue its efforts to educate
businesses on reasonable data security practices to help
them prevent future breaches from occurring. The
commission’s body of fifty data security settlements
reflects its commitment to ensure that companies employ
reasonable measures to safeguard consumer data. As the
commission moves forward, it will continue to hold
companies accountable for practices that violate the law
by falling short of this standard.118
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To assess the effectiveness of the FTC’s approach, this section will review
some of the most significant data breaches that have occurred over the
past five years to evaluate whether these companies took reasonable
measures, such as the five principles articulated by the FTC,119 to protect
sensitive data. The following examples show large corporations, with
ample resources, that failed to take basic, reasonable measures to protect
sensitive consumer data. These companies’ failures led to some of the
largest data breaches in history.120
A. Target
In the fall of 2013, hackers accessed Target’s computer network
and stole financial and personal information from more than 110 million
customers.121 On December 19, 2013, Target publicly announced that 40
million credit and debit card accounts were compromised in the breach.122
Less than a month later, on January 10, 2014, Target indicated that roughly
70 million customers had non-financial data stolen during the same
breach.123 The stolen data was then sold on various black market forums,
with many banks not having enough time to identify and cancel stolen
cards before fraudulent purchases were made.124
Ultimately, an analysis of the data breach showed that Target failed
in four ways to either stop the hackers or prevent the data breach from
occurring.125 First, Target provided a third-party vendor with network
access.126 The vendor did not follow the commonly accepted industry
standards for protecting information, which allowed the hackers to enter
Target’s network.127 Second, Target ignored numerous automated
119
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warnings from its data protection software, including warning messages
that indicated that attackers were installing malware on Target’s
network.128 Third, there was evidence based on the way the hackers
moved within Target’s network that the attackers started in a less sensitive
area of the network before moving to the high sensitive areas storing
consumer data, which potentially means that Target did not effectively
protect its most sensitive data networks.129 Fourth, Target failed to
respond to its own warning systems indicating the “escape routes” the
hackers planned on exploiting to steal the data from the network.130
Overall, Target was held accountable for its unreasonable data
security practices. Target settled a class-action with the consumers
harmed by the data breach for $10 million.131 Additionally, Target agreed
to pay forty-seven states and the District of Columbia $18.5 million to
settle the claims that could have been brought under these states’ various
consumer protection acts, personal information protection acts, and
security breach notification acts.132 Finally, Target settled class-action
claims with a number of U.S. financial institutions, including Visa and
MasterCard, for more than $100 million.133 Nonetheless, these settlements
were reactive, occurring after hackers already stole the consumer data and
sold it on the black market. Instead, the current laws regulating data
security practices need to require companies to be proactive in taking
128
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reasonable steps to prevent these data breaches from occurring in the first
place.
B. Home Depot
In September of 2014, Home Depot informed consumers that its
payment card systems were hacked, with 56 million payment cards stolen
during the breach.134 To make matters worse, the method in which the
hackers accessed Home Depot’s network was the same way the hackers
infiltrated Target’s network.135 Ultimately, this breach was larger than the
one that Target suffered, even though the Target breach happened almost
a year earlier.136 Home Depot, along with other companies, should have
learned from the Target data breach to protect their payment card
systems.137 This highlights the fact that monetary penalties that are
enforced either by federal regulatory agencies, like the FTC, or by states
do not motivate companies to be proactive in taking reasonable data
security measures. Thus far, Home Depot has reached settlements
agreeing to pay more than $27 million to financial institutions138 and $19.5
million to the consumers harmed.139 Currently, there are a number of
states investigating the Home Depot data breach.140 However, the FTC
has still not taken any action against the company, even after two U.S.
Senators called on the FTC to investigate the data breach.141 In terms of
Brett Hawkins, Case Study: The Home Depot Data Breach, SANS INSTITUTE 2, 4 (Jan.
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Home Depot’s failure to take reasonable steps to protect its data,
computer experts from within the company have come forward to
announce that they warned the company for years of the potential
vulnerabilities the company’s network faced.142
C. Equifax
The most recent company to suffer a high-profile data breach is
Equifax. The company suffered a series of data breaches from May to
July of 2017.143 Hackers obtained over 143 million consumers’ personal
data including Social Security numbers, birth dates, addresses, and driver’s
license numbers.144 Hackers accessed Equifax’s networks through a webapplication vulnerability that was made publicly known in March.145 Thus,
Equifax had over two months to update and patch the web-application
vulnerability before the hack took place.146 Besides the failure to update
its software, Equifax is also being widely criticized for the amount of time
it took the company to disclose that a breach occurred: six weeks.147
Although it is too early to tell whether the FTC or any other government
agencies will bring an action against Equifax, Congress has held a number
of hearings related to the hack.148 During one of the hearings in which the
former CEO of Equifax testified, Congressman Joe Barton stated that
Julie Creswell & Nicole Perlroth, Ex-Employees Say Home Depot Left Data Vulnerable,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/business/exemployees-say-home-depot-left-data-vulnerable.html (suggesting that Home Depot
relied on outdated software to protect its systems and that numerous employees on the
data security team left the company over management’s failure to acknowledge their
concerns).
142
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Congress needs to impose “some teeth” at the federal level for regulating
data breaches.149
D. The Inadequacy of Current Data Breach Laws and Regulations
Ultimately, this review shows that the current federal and state
laws and regulations are not effective in preventing data breaches from
occurring. The number of data breaches has continued to rise over the
past decade.150 Furthermore, many corporate officers and boards of
directors still do not actively participate in overseeing or managing their
companies’ data privacy practices.151 As one expert states, “A few very
public breaches aside—Target is an example—corporations find it
cheaper to spend money on PR campaigns touting good security, weather
the occasional press storm and round of lawsuits when they are proven
wrong, and fix problems after they become public.”152 The three examples
above are proof that Congress needs to reform the current legal landscape
regulating data security to incentivize companies to be proactive in
implementing reasonable data security practices. Any reforms in the data
security realm must create harsher penalties for companies with
unreasonable data security practices so that companies no longer view data
breaches as a cost of doing business.
IV. A TWO-TRACKED APPROACH TO IMPROVING
BUSINESSES’ DATA SECURITY PRACTICES
As the number of data breaches continue to rise, more people are
starting to advocate for an overhaul of the current legal landscape
governing data security.153 There are a couple of common problems with
the current system, including a lack of uniformity creating gaps in the law,
Oversight of the Equifax Data Breach: Answers for Consumers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. Dig.
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compliance difficulties due to many differing laws, and a reactive rather
than proactive approach to improving data protection.154 To remedy many
of these problems, Congress needs to adopt a uniform federal law that
preempts state laws governing data privacy. This prevents the headaches
for companies that transact business in many different states caused by
having to comply with differing state data breach notification laws.155 In
addition, a uniform federal law would replace the current federal approach
of industry-specific laws, which creates gaps.156
The federal law would start by defining two general categories of
information that businesses may obtain: (1) personally identifiable
information (PII) and (2) non-personally identifiable information (nonPII). For example, Congress could borrow the definition used by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) in defining PII for other
government agencies. The GAO defines PII as “any information about
an individual maintained by an agency . . . that can be used to distinguish
or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, Social Security number, date
and place of birth, . . . [and] any other information that is linked or linkable
to an individual.”157 The federal statute could then define non-PII as
anything that is not captured by the PII definition. The purpose of having
the two categories of information is to encourage corporations to only use
non-PII by making the compliance requirements, as discussed below,
much less stringent than the requirements for corporations obtaining PII.
This adds an extra layer of protection for consumers by reducing the
overall amount of PII obtained by a corporation, which in turn lessens the
harm to consumers if and when a data breach occurs.
The GAO’s definition of PII is suitable for use in a uniform
federal law because it is written for a variety of agencies in different
industries and is based on the synthesis of numerous definitions of PII in
various Office of Management and Budget memorandum.158 This is
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supported by the definitions use of the broad language “maintained by an
agency” instead of specifying the particular agencies to which the definition
applies.159 Thus, the GAO’s definition of PII is not industry-specific. A
broad, non-industry specific definition of PII is needed for the very
reasons that the current industry-specific federal laws, mentioned
previously, are inadequate at regulating data security: industry-specific laws
create gaps.160
Congress would also need to authorize the Department of
Commerce’s National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to
promulgate industry standards that businesses must follow to protect their
data.161 The industry standards would vary based on the category of
information. Thus, companies obtaining PII would have more stringent
standards than companies obtaining only non-PII. The remainder of the
statute would then be bifurcated into two tracks: a PII track and a nonPII track.
The NIST is best positioned to establish and monitor
cybersecurity standards because its focus is on commerce in general, not
a specific industry or business segment.162 Moreover, the NIST has already
established a cybersecurity framework that 30% of businesses follow.163
In addition, it is projected that close to 50% of businesses will follow this
framework by the year 2020.164 Further, the NIST’s industry standards are
most likely the least disruptive to the business community, as the NIST
formulated its cybersecurity framework in collaboration with the private

TECHNOLOGY,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
COM.
ES-1,
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-122/final.

n.6

(2010),

159

GAO Report on Information Security, supra note 157, at 5 n.9 (emphasis added).

160

See supra Section II.B.

NAT’L
INST.
STAND.
TECH.,
CYBERSECURITY
FRAMEWORK,
https://www.nist.gov/industry-impacts/cybersecurity (last visited Nov. 16, 2017)
[hereinafter Cybersecurity Framework].
161

NAT’L INST. STAND. TECH., NIST MISSION, VISION, CORE COMPETENCIES, AND
CORE VALUES, U.S. DEP’T OF COM, https://www.nist.gov/about-nist/ourorganization/mission-vision-values (last updated Jan. 26, 2017).
162

163

Cybersecurity Framework, supra note 161.

164

Id.

2018]

YOU’VE BEEN HACKED

141

sector.165 Thus, the private sector is involved in creating the cybersecurity
standards that they will have to follow.
The biggest concern with authorizing the NIST to formulate the
industry standards is the potential for businesses that collaborate with the
NIST to advocate for lower standards so that it is easier for businesses to
comply with the law. If this were to occur, one option would be for
Congress to amend the enabling authority for the NIST, specifying that it
may not collaborate with the private sector in creating cybersecurity
standards. Alternatively, Congress could set minimum cybersecurity
standards in the uniform federal law and then allow the NIST to add
various standards on top of the ones already established in the statute.
Overall, the concern with having the NIST collaborate with the private
sector in formulating cybersecurity standards may not result in the
lowering of those standards. After all, this collaborative process is not all
that different from the regulatory process that many federal agencies
follow when promulgating their rules.166
Under the PII track, the board of directors would be required to
form a committee or subcommittee that oversees the company’s data
security practices.167 The statute would impose personal liability on the
directors who sit on that committee, as well as the corporate officers who
are tasked with implementing the company’s data security plan. These
directors and officers would be liable for any negligent (i.e. unreasonable)
data security measures that lead to a data breach.
Within the corporate governance structure, the board should be
tasked with monitoring a company’s data security practices for a couple of
reasons. First, directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its
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INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY, U.S. DEP’T OF COM 1
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shareholders.168 One of those duties is the duty of oversight, which falls
under a director’s broader duty of loyalty.169 Because data breaches have
a direct impact on a company’s bottom line,170 directors are obligated to
ensure that their company prevents these breaches to the greatest extent
possible. A second reason for holding the board directly accountable for
a company’s cybersecurity practices is because of its role in appointing
corporate officers.171 The officers of a company are going to be
instrumental in monitoring a company’s data security practices on a day–
to–day level. If an officer fails to meet the level of data security monitoring
and protection that the board wishes to achieve, the board can replace that
officer.172
At first blush, this may seem too harsh. However, the statute
would also provide a safe harbor for these individuals. To obtain the safe
harbor’s protection from personal liability, the company would simply
need to follow the industry standards set by the NIST for companies
obtaining PII. If the company follows these standards, then these
directors and corporate officers could not be held personally liable. A final
requirement under this track is that companies obtaining PII would be
required to obtain a yearly audit conducted by an independent third-party.
This audit would provide an internal mechanism for companies to ensure
that they comply with the current industry standards. In addition, the
company would need to file the audits with the FTC as proof of
compliance with the industry standards that provide the safe harbor from
personal liability.
Under the non-PII track, a company would need to follow the
industry standards set by the NIST for companies obtaining non-PII data.
If a data breach occurs, the company can be held liable under a bad faith
standard of liability. This standard of liability is modeled off of a director’s
duty of oversight as established in In re Caremark International Derivative
Anne Tucker Nees, Who’s the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability within the Corporate Power
Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 208 (2010).
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Litigation.173 Thus, a company under the non-PII track would be liable for
a data breach if it had a sustained and systemic failure to exercise
reasonable oversight.174 However, if the directors tasked with overseeing
data security or the corporate managers in charge of implementing the
company’s data security practices knowingly or intentionally violate the
industry standards, then they could be held personally liable for any data
breach. Finally, there would be no yearly audit requirement for businesses
that are only obtaining non-PII. This would reduce the cost of complying
with the federal statute and would provide an incentive for companies to
only obtain PII if necessary for their business operations. This avoids the
costs of a yearly audit and filing requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
The current legal landscape for data privacy and protection has
proven inadequate to curb the number of data breaches that companies
suffer each year. In the wake of the Equifax data breach, many experts
have called on Congress to take action to prevent future data breaches
caused by unreasonable corporate behavior. Any future legislation in the
area of data security needs to address the current issues that the regulatory,
federal, and state laws create, including gaps in the law, compliance
headaches for businesses transacting across numerous states, and the
reactive nature to preventing data breaches. Ultimately, the proposed
uniform federal statute discussed here would remedy these problems and,
hopefully, reduce the number of data breaches that occur in the future.
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